Political Confederation

Jacques Crémer () and Thomas Palfrey

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of different institutional arrangements for allocating policy-making authority among confederated districts. Using a variation on the spatial model of political competition, we compare different rules for aggregating preferences acrossthese jurisdictions, under the assumption that voters face uncertainty about the distribution of preferences of other voters.

Keywords: INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Political Confederation (1997)
Working Paper: Political Confederation (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.465

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