Refining in Continuous Signaling Games Satisfying the Single-Crossing Condition

Jocelyn Donze ()

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper studies equilibrium refinements in continuous signaling games satifying the single-crossing condition. While most classical criteria select the Riley sparating equilibrium, it is first argued that this equilibrium is not necessarily the most appealing solution and that pooling equilibria also merit attention for some values of the prior probability distribution. A new refinement, the concept of globally consistent equilibrium is then proposed. This criterion is shown to selecta unique sequential equilibrium, namely the lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium, which may involve pooling.

Keywords: INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:976.422

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