Empirical Game Theoretic Models: Constrained Equilibrium & Simulation

Olivier Armantier, Jean-Pierre Florens and Jean-Francois Richard

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: We propose an operational concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) applicable to a broad class of empirical game theoreticmodels with incomplete information. By restricting the players' strategic sets, we can compute solutions from a strategic form of analyis based upon auxiliary Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMETRICS; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 C51 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.498

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