Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System

Xavier Freixas () and Emmanuelle Gabillon ()

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula.

Keywords: RISK; BANKS; INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G21 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.506

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