Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System
Xavier Freixas () and
Emmanuelle Gabillon ()
Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ
We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula.
Keywords: RISK; BANKS; INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 D81 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
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Journal Article: Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System (1999)
Working Paper: Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.506
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