The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector

Doh-Shin Jeon and Jean-Jacques Laffont

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: We study the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency. Each agent is assumed to have two type-dependent reservation utilities: the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that he expects to obtain if he enters the private sector.

Keywords: ADVERSE SELECTION; PUBLIC SECTOR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 H40 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.509

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