Incentive Regulatory Policies: the Case of Public Transit Systems in France

Philippe Gagnepain and Marc Ivaldi

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper is aimed at assesssing the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation inspired by the theory of incentives. It contributes to the econometrics of asymmetric information models by using the principal-agent framework for studying the regulatory schemes used in French urban transport industry.

Keywords: INCENTIVES; BEHAVIOUR; REGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D80 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France (2002)
Working Paper: Incentive Regulatory policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France (2002)
Working Paper: Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.515

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