Designing yous Investor's Adequate Incentives

Antoine Renucci

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper studies the design of financial agreements (claims, tightness of relationships) between entrepreneurs and investors, in the case where both must exert costly unobservable efforts to improve the profitability of the firm.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; INCENTIVES; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D80 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.520

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