Competition in Environmental Labeling

Lisette Ibanez

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper analyzes environmental labeling strategies in a duopoly market. We consider a three-stage game where firms successively choose their production technology, label signal and price. The willingness to pay for the environmental quality is explained by an altruistic parameter as consumers are volontarily contributing to the preservation of the environment, which is a public good.

Keywords: ENVIRONMENT; LABELS; OLIGOPOLIES; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 L15 L19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.524

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().