The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence

Emmanuelle Gabillon () and David Martimort

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between a central banker and his partisan political principals. Incentive contracts for central bankers are not designed by social planners but by partisan political principals who obey to their own incentives.

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; MONETARY POLICY; POLITICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E52 E58 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1999
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Related works:
Journal Article: The benefits of central bank's political independence (2004)
Working Paper: The benefits of central bank's political independence (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.528

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