The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society

M.J. Holler and B.-A. Wickstrom

Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre from University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics

Abstract: Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. it is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by prominent persons.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; SOCIAL CHOICE; CONFLICTS; SOCIETY; CULTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 J19 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:hambec:105

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