Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research
If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of "welfare optima." A game form (or "mechanism") implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties - monotonicity and no veto power - can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality* (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:harver:1829
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().