Federalism With and Without Political Centralization. China versus Russia

Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First, capture by old firms, leading local governments to protect them from competition by new entrants. Second, competition for rents by local officials, eliminating incentives for new firms to enter.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (105)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia (2001)
Working Paper: Federalism With and Without Political Centralization:China Versus Russia (2001)
Working Paper: Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:harver:1889

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().