Coordination under Uncertainty

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

No 1969, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: A decision maker needs to schedule several activities that take uncertain time to complete and are only valuable together. Some activities are bound to be finished earlier than others, thus incurring waiting costs. We show how to schedule activities optimally, how to give independent agents performing them incentives that implement the efficient schedule, how to form teams, and how to optimally reduce uncertainty when it is possible to do so at a cost. The paper offers insights into important economic decisions such as planning large projects and coordinating product development activities.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2002/HIER1969.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2002/HIER1969.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2002/HIER1969.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:harver:1969

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().