Adoption of Standards under Uncertainty

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

No 2013, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: The presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical impact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. The criterion for the viability of a standard is that the sum of \support ratios" of all players must be smaller than one, where \support ratio" is de ned as the ratio of the rm's per-period cost of supporting the standard to the per-period gross bene t that the rm receives after all players comply with the standard.

Date: 2003
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Journal Article: Adoption of Standards Under Uncertainty (2005)
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