Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Satoru Takahashi

No 2051, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.

Date: 2004
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Related works:
Journal Article: Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient (2007)
Working Paper: Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient (2007)
Working Paper: Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient (2004)
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