EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Gender and Say A Model of Household Behavior with Endogenously-determined Balance of Power

Kaushik Basu

No 2054, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: The evidence that the same total income can lead a household to choose different consumption vectors, depending on who brings in how much of the income, has led to an effort to replace the standard unitary model of the household with the ‘collective model’, which recognizes that the husband and the wife may have different preferences and depending on the balance of power between them the household may choose differently. One weakness of this new literature is that it fails to recognize that the household’s choice could in turn influence the balance of power. Once this two-way relation between choice and power is recognized we are forced to confront some new questions concerning how to model the household. This paper tries to answer these by defining a ‘household equilibrium’, examining its game-theoretic properties and drawing out its testable implications. It is shown, for instance, that once we allow for dynamic interaction a household can exhibit inefficient behavior, and that (for a certain class of parameters) children will be less likely to work in a household where power is evenly balanced, than one in which all power is concentrated in the hands of either the father or the mother. The paper also draws out the implications for female labor supply.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2004/HIER2054.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2004/HIER2054.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2004/HIER2054.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Gender and Say: a Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power (2006)
Working Paper: Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behavior with Endogenously-Determined Balance of Power (2001) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:harver:2054

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:2054