Does the Composition of Wage and Payroll Taxes Matter Under Nash Bargaining

Erkki Koskela and R. Schob
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ronnie Schoeb

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: According to conventional wisdom the total taxe wedge, which is the sum of wage and payroll taxes, is sufficient to specify the distortion of wage formation caused by labour taxation. Using Nash bargaining approach to wage negotiations this paper shows that conventional wisdom is valid for equal rax bases, e.g., when the tax exemption takes the form of a tax credit.

Keywords: TAXES; WAGES; BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 J21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining? (1999)
Working Paper: Does the Composition of Wage and Payroll Taxes Matter Under Nash Bargaining? (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:helsec:443

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