Repeated Divisible Good Auctions with Price-Taking Bidders

M. Tervio

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies divisible good auctions in a setupt where the good has a common value and the bidders can make multiple bids at different price-quality combinations.

Keywords: AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 E44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:helsec:444

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