Learning Dynamics: Complete and Incomplete Learning

Seppo Honkapohja

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: Models of expextations formation via learning by economic agents have recently been developed in the literature. Currently, the most common approach leads to complete learning in which asymptotically agents have rational expectations (though cases of instability also exist). Dynamics with learning can differ radically rational expectations (RE) dynamics. The paper illustrates the possibilities of an equilibrium dynamics using a simple model of coordination failures.

Keywords: ECONOMIC POLICY; EXPECTATIONS; LEARNING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D83 E10 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Chapter: Learning Dynamics: Complete and Incomplete Learning (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:helsec:460

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