Learning Dynamics: Complete and Incomplete Learning
Seppo Honkapohja ()
University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics
Models of expextations formation via learning by economic agents have recently been developed in the literature. Currently, the most common approach leads to complete learning in which asymptotically agents have rational expectations (though cases of instability also exist). Dynamics with learning can differ radically rational expectations (RE) dynamics. The paper illustrates the possibilities of an equilibrium dynamics using a simple model of coordination failures.
Keywords: ECONOMIC POLICY; EXPECTATIONS; LEARNING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E10 E50 C62 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:helsec:460
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