Optimal Public Harvesting under the Interdependence between Private and Public Stands

Erkki Koskela and M. Ollikainen

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper uses the Hartman rotation framework to examine the optimal rotation age of public harvesting, when private and public stands may be interdependent in the provision of amenity services. The interaction between private and public agents is modeled as a two-stage game, where in the first stage the government (represented by the Forest Service) acts as a Stackelberg leader decides upon harvesting and, given that, private harvesting is chosen in the second stage.

Keywords: CONSUMPTION; PUBLIC SECTOR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:helsec:471

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