Optimal Forest Taxation under Private and Social Amenity Valuation

Erkki Koskela and M. Ollikainen

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzez socially optimal forest taxation when the government has a binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of forest taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax, site value tax or profit tax.

Keywords: TAXATION; ENVIRONMENT; GOVERNMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 Q23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Forest Taxation under Private and Social Amenity Valuation (2002)
Working Paper: Optimal Forest Taxation under Private and Social Amenity Valuation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:helsec:498

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