Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict

Joan Esteban () and Debraj Ray

Working Papers from El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza

Abstract: In this short paper, we ask the following question: Why is lobbying so endemic in societies? Put another way, might it not be possible to design a social decision rule that assigns to each group its equilibrium probability of success, and sidestep the inefficient waste of resources that results from conflict?

Keywords: DECISION; MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Social decision rules are not immune to conflict (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:ieegpb:22

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