Collective Action and Group Size Paradox

Joan Esteban (joan.esteban@iae.csic.es) and Debraj Ray

Working Papers from El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza

Abstract: The Olson Paradox referes to the observation that larger groups may be less successful in furthering their interests. We address the paradox within an explicit game-theoretic model of lobbying.

Keywords: DECISION MAKING; LOBBYING; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Chapter: Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox (2008)
Journal Article: Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:ieegpb:23

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