Temporary Alliance Formation: Endogenous Sequencing in Conflict Games

Joan Esteban () and József Sákovics

Working Papers from El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza

Abstract: We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and , in case they win, later they fifht it out among themselves.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:ieegpb:43

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