Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: Evidence from India

J. Sarkar and S. Sarkar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Subrata Sarkar ()

Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-

Abstract: This paper provides evidence on the role of large shareholders in monitoring company value from a developing country, India, whose corporate governance system is a hybrid of the ousider-dominated-market-based systems of the UK and the US and the insider-dominated-bank-based systems of Germany and Japan. The picture of large-shareholder monitoring that emerges from our case study of Indian corporates is a mixed one.

Keywords: BUSINESS FINANCING; SHAREHOLDERS; INDIA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 L10 P21 P23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:indgan:153

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