Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self Incrimination

Eric Rasmusen ()

Working Papers from Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research

Abstract: This paper uses the economic approach to address a recent legal quesiton involving self incrimination: what is the effect of allowing a defendant to waive his right to exclude statements he makes during plea bargaining from evidence at trial if plea bargaining fails? This was the issue in the 1995 Mazzanatto Supreme Court decision. What is the reason for such waivers, and do they increase or decrease the amount of plea bargaining.

Keywords: LAW (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:indian:98-001

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