The Implications of Intertemporal Consistency for Patent Licensing

A.I. Saracho

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: A patent provides its holder the monopolist's right to sell licenses that allow the use of new knowledge or an innovation during a certain period of time. The patent holder therefore faces the typical commitment problem of the durable-goods monopolist. This intertemporal consistency problem appears when the monopolist does not have the ability to commit to a future schedule of license sales.

Keywords: PATENTS; MONOPOLIES; INNOVATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O32 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:171

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