Strategyproof Single Unit Award Rules

Szilvia Pápai ()

Working Papers from Koc University

Abstract: The problem of allocating a single indivisible unit to one of several selfish agents is considered, where monetary transfers are not allowed, and the unit is not necessarily desirable to each agent. In addition to strategyproffness, three important properties are considered: Pareto-optimality, nondictatorship, and nonbossiness. It is shown that these four criteria cannot be satisfied by any social choice function, that is, a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result is established for nonbossy mechanisms.

Keywords: SOCIAL; CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Strategyproof single unit award rules (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:kocuni:1998/02

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