Subsidy-Allocation Rules for Infant Industries

Sylvain Dessy ()

Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Energie

Abstract: The optimal subsidy allocation mechanism is studied for a benevolent public-policy-decision maker faced with the task of assisting a domestic "infant" firm in its attempt to become established in an international industry.

Keywords: INDUSTRY; ENTERPRISES; TECHNOLOGY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H80 H81 L10 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavaen:9621

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