Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up?

Christopher Waller, Thierry Verdier and Roy Gardner

Working Papers from Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie

Abstract: We study the degree of corruption in a hierarchical model of government. In particular, we explore the question of whether adding a layer of government simply increases the total amount of corruption or generates an organizational efficiency (via a principal-agent relationship between levels of government) that reduces the total amount of corruption.

Keywords: CORRUPTION; SOCIETY; ECONOMIC MODELS; GOVERNMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Journal Article: Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up? (2002)
Working Paper: Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up? (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavale:1999-12

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