Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism

M. Breton, Pascal St-Amour and Désiré Vencatachellum ()

Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique

Abstract: This paper studies the informational content of elective teams in a dynamic principal/multiple-agents framework with adverse selection. Two agents with different employment histories are paid their conditional expected marginal product. They observe their types (good or bad), and choose between working together or separately. We characterize the distributions on agents' types, nature and wages such that teams are formed exclusively by good-type agents, with and without side payments. As employment records matter when idiosyncratic contributions are difficult to isolate, a good-type agent prefers not to jeopardize his reputation by teaming up with a bad-type agent.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism (1998)
Working Paper: Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavape:9808

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREPE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().