Executive Control, Performance and Compensation in French Firms

A. Alcouffe and C. Alcouffe
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alain Alcouffe

Working Papers from LIRHE - Universite des sciences sociales Toulouse

Abstract: The paper introduces first the legal framework as it has been developed by French jurisprudence which distinguishes the social interest of the firm from the interest of all stakeholders. Then, it presents the monitoring of executives in several fields, commodity markets, the financial market, stock exchange and evaluates the different means of control and incentives. In the second part, French data relative to stakeholders and boards are scrutinised.

Keywords: BUSINESS ORGANIZATION; ENTERPRISES; FRANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G32 L20 O52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lirhet:289

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