Share Ownership and the Alignment of Stakeholder's Interests in French Large Companies

A. Alcouffe and C. Alcouffe
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alain Alcouffe

Working Papers from LIRHE - Universite des sciences sociales Toulouse

Abstract: There is very few reliable data on French executive compensations, but compiling all recent disclosures, we find consistent hints proving that stock options are a big issue in this framework. In order to explain how stock option plans arrived to play so important part in executive compensation, we have to present some features of French corporate governance.

Keywords: SHAREHOLDERS; OWNERSHIP; BUSINESS FINANCING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lirhet:303

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