When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses

R. Brooks, J. Controneo, Michael Murray and Stephen Salant

Working Papers from Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory

Keywords: COMMON PROPERTY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1995
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Journal Article: When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:michet:95-10

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