Private Storage of Common Property
Gérard Gaudet (),
Michel Moreaux and
Stephen Salant ()
Working Papers from Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory
This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: extracted common reserves are often stored privately rather than sold immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage, Privatization of common reserves through storage may eliminate inefficiency altogether but the premature extraction involved may also exacerbate them-even if rapid extraction does not reduce ultimate recovery.
Keywords: COLLECTIVE OWNERSHIP; STORAGE; NATURAL RESOURCES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q30 Q32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Private Storage of Common Property (2002)
Working Paper: Private Storage of Common Property (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:michet:97-08
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().