Working Papers

From Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A..
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1992: A Computational Algorithm for Optimal Collusion in Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly

D. Roth

1992: Financial Arbitragers and the Efficiency of Corporate Control

D.D. Li

1992: Information, Control Right and Distressed Firms' Choices Between Workoutss and Bankruptcy

D.D. Li and S. Li

1992: Public Ownership as a Sufficient Condition for the Soft Budget Constraint

D.D. Li

1992: Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures: A Comment on the Literature

Stephen Salant and G. Shaffer

1992: Asymptotic Bias in Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation of Discrete Choice Models

Lung-Fei Lee

1992: Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods

James Andreoni and Ted Bergstrom

1992: Income Prospects and Age at Marriage

Ted Bergstrom and Robert Schoeni

1992: Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device

M.J. White

1992: Consistent Estimation of Linear and Nonlinear Errors-in- variables Models with Validation Information

Lung-Fei Lee and J.H. Sepanski

1992: Non-Linear Contracts, Foreclosure, and Exclusive Dealing

D.P. O'Brien and G. Shaffer

1992: Intertemporal Self-Selection with Multiple Buyers Under Complete and Incomplete Information

M. Bagholi, Stephen Salant and J.E. Swierzbinski

1992: Cartel Quotas Under Majority Rule

Jonathan Cave and Stephen Salant

1992: The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition: Further Results

Stephen Salant and Gérard Gaudet

1992: Surviving Winter: A Fitness-Based Explanation of Hoarding and Hibernation

Stephen Salant, K. Kalat and A. Wheatcroft

1992: Asymptotic Distribution of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator for Stochastic Frontier Function Model with a Singular Information Matrix

Lung-Fei Lee

1991: Semiparametric Minimum-Distance Estimation

Lung-Fei Lee

1991: The Two-Sex Problem and the Marriage Squeeze in an Equilibrium Model of Mariage Market

Ted Bergstrom and David Lam

1991: The Existence of Pareto Superior Price Limits and Trading Halts

L.E. Kodres and D.P. O'Brien

1991: Peak-Load Pricing-with and without Constrained Rate of reforn

Ted Bergstrom and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

1991: Courtship as a Waiting Game

Ted Bergstrom and M. Bagnali

1991: Multiple Minima in the Estimation of Models with Autoregressive Disturbances

H. Doran and Jan Kmenta

1991: Price Discrimination and Intertemporal Self-Selection

M. Bagnoli, Stephen Salant and J.E. Swierzbinski

1991: Capturing Strategic Rent: Full-Line Forcing, Maximum Resale Price Maintenance, Brand Discount and Aggregate Rebates

G. Shaffer

1991: Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata

K. Binmore and Larry Samuelson

1991: Foudations of Game Theory

K. Binmore

1991: Growth and International Investment with Diverging Population

Alan Deardorff

1991: When Non-Transitive Relations Take Maxima and Competitive Equilibrium Can't Be Beat

Ted Bergstrom

1991: Bargaining and Morality

K. Binmore

1991: DeBayesing Game Theory

K. Binmore

1991: A Liberal Leviathan

K. Binmore

1991: Sequential Provision of Public Goods

Hal Varian

1991: Goodness of Fit for Revealed Preference Tests

Hal Varian

1991: The Economics of User Interface

Hal Varian

1991: A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed

Hal Varian

1990: Decentralized Dynamic Processes for Finding Equilibrium

Stanley Reiter and C. Simon

1990: Estimation of the Covariance Matrix of the Least Squares regression Coefficients when the Disturbance Covariance Matrix is of Unknown Form

R.W. Keener, Jan Kmenta and N.C. Weber

1990: Vertical Control in Markets with Multilateral Competition

D.P. O'Brien and G. Shaffer

1990: For Sale by Owner: When to Use a Realtor and How to Price the House

Stephen Salant

1990: Marriage and Neutrality

John Laitner

1990: Courtship as a Waiting Game

Ted Bergstrom and M. Bagnoli

1990: WHY ARE TAXES SO COMPLEX AND WHO BENEFITS?

M.J. White

1990: SEQUENTIAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

Hal Varian

1990: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS WHEN AGENTS ARE WELL-INFORMED

Hal Varian

1989: The Effects of Cohort Size on Mariage Market in Twentieth Century Sweden

Ted Bergstrom and David Lam

1989: BARGAINING WITHOUT TEARS

K. Binmore

1989: STOCK PRICE MANIPULATION THROUGH TAKEOVER BIDS

M. Bagnoli and Barton Lipman

1989: ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP: A BARGAINING MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SETTLEMENTS

D. O'Brien

1989: SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: A COMPARAISON OF FACILITATING PRACTICES

G. Shaffer

1989: TESTING HYPOTHESES ABOUT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS IN MISSPECIFIED MODELS

D.K. Bhattacharyya and Jan Kmenta

1989: INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH LUMPY COUNTRIES

Paul Courant and Alan Deardorff

1989: GOODNESS-OF-FIT OPTIMIZING MODELS

Hal Varian

1989: NON-PARTITIONAL INFORMATION ON DYNAMIC STATE SPACES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECULATION

Hyun Song Shin

1989: YOUR TERMS OR MINE? THE DUTY TO READ THE FINE PRINT IN CONTRACTS

A. Katz

1989: NONCOOPERATIVE MODELS OF BARGAINING

K. Binmore, Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein

1989: PREDICTING COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY-RULE VOTING EXPERIMENTS

Stephen Salant and E. Goodstein

1989: TOWARDS A THEORY OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS

Gérard Gaudet and Stephen Salant

1989: LOG-CONCAVE PROBABILITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS

M. Bagnoli and Ted Bergstrom

1989: EFFICIENCY IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES: DARWIN, NASH AND SECRET HANDSHAKE

Arthur Robson

1989: STOCK MARKET FORECASTABILITY AND VOLATILITY: A STATISTICAL APPRAISAL

N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and Matthew Shapiro

1989: VOLUMTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THE MULTIPLE UNIT CASE

M. Bagnoli, S. Ben-David and Michael McKee

1989: DISTANCE, DEMAND, AND OLIGOPOLY PRICING

Robert Feenstra and James Levinsohn

1989: MONITORING AGENTS WITH OTHER AGENTS

Hal Varian

1989: SEQUENTIAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

Hal Varian

1989: A SIMPLE, CONSISTENT ESTIMATOR FOR DISTURBANCE COMPONENTS IN FINANCIAL MODELS

James Levinsohn and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

1989: DO PEOPLE EXPLOIT THEIR BARGAINING POWER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

K. Binmore, P. Morgan, A. Shaked and J. Sutton

1988: SOME FINE-TUNING FOR DOMINANT DIAGONAL MATRICES

C.P. Simon

1988: AN AMPIRICAL TEST OF THE EFFICIENCY OF LIABILITY RULES IN ACCIDENT LAW

M.J. White

1988: LEGAL COMPLEXITY

M.J. White

1988: GOODNESS-OF-FIT IN DEMAND ANALYSIS

Hal Varian

1988: UNIQUENESS OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM: NEW RESULTS FROM OLD METHODS

Gérard Gaudet and Stephen Salant

1988: THE PROFITABILITY OF EXOGENOUS OUTPUT CONTACTIONS

Gérard Gaudet and Stephen Salant

1988: THE FOUNDING OF THE FED AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE POST-1914 ECONOMY

Jeffrey Miron

1988: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARAISON OF SEASONAL CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES

Jeffrey Miron

1988: A COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND GAME THEORY

K. Binmore and A. Brandeburge

1988: SOCIAL CONTRACT III: EVOLUTION AND UTILITARIANISM

K. Binmore

1988: SOCIAL CONTRACT II: GAUTHIER AND NASH

K. Binmore

1988: SOCIAL CONTRACT I: HARSANYI AND RAWLS

K. Binmore

1988: SOME SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF PEAK-LOAD PRICING

Ted Bergstrom and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

1988: CARROT AND YARDSTICK REGULATION: ENHANCING MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH OUTPUT PRIZES

M. Bagnoli and Severin Borenstein

1988: PACMAN REFUTES THE COASE CONJECTURE: DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLY WITH DISCRETE DEMAND

M. Bagnoli, Stephen Salant and J.E. Swierzbinski

1988: COMPETITION AND PRODUCT LINE CHOICE

M. Bagnoli and J.B. Barbeau

1988: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PATENT POLICY

Jerry Hausman and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

1988: NOTES ON PEAK LOAD PRICING

Ted Bergstrom and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

1988: A NOTE ON OPTIMAL CONTRACT DAMAGES WHEN LITIGATION IS COSTLY

A. Katz

1988: URBAN COMMUTING JOURNEYS ARE NOT WASTEFUL

M.J. White