The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game

Andrew McLennan ()

Working Papers from Minnesota - Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We propose a model of a random normal game for given (finite nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies; this model is shown to be canonical in a certain sense.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:minner:306

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Minnesota - Center for Economic Research UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().