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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Entry

Anthony Creane and M Hall

Working Papers from Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory

Abstract: Firms regularly introduce new, non-patentable products and innovations. When the possibility of a new product or an innovation arises to a potential seller, the seller faces a risk in successfully creating and producing a new product that consumers value above its costs. This framework enables a new analysis of signaling and adverse selection in models of fixed, exogenous quality or types.

Keywords: RISK; DECISION MAKING; UNCERTAINTY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1994
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