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Composition of Government Budget, Non-Single Peakedness and Majority Voting

Peter Bearse, Gerhard Glomm () and E. Jeneba

Working Papers from Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory

Abstract: In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single-peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revennues is used to finance a uniform lump-sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single-crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium.

Keywords: VOTING; TAXES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E60 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1999
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