Extending Market Power through Vertical Integration

Catherine de Fontenay and Joshua Gans

Working Papers from New South Wales - School of Economics

Abstract: This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write binding long-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertical separated monopolist is vulnerable to hold-up. Without integration, the authors demonstrate that a bottleneck monopolist has an incentive to encourage more firms in a related segment than would arise in a pure monopoly.

Keywords: MONOPOLIES; MARKET STRUCTURE; VERTICAL INTEGRATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nesowa:99/2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from New South Wales - School of Economics THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, P.O.B. 1 KENSINGTON, NEW SOUTH WALES 2033 AUSTRALIA.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().