Vulcans and Klingons (part one): Simulating an Evolutionary Game with Random Matching and Adjustable Expectations

Frédéric Gaspart (frederic.gaspart@uclouvain.be)

Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales

Abstract: The possibility of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma without memory is investigated in an evolutionary framework where 1) some agents ('Vulcans') are morally commited to cooperation, 2) some others ('Klingons') are not commited at all, and 3) there is random matching.

Keywords: GAMES; EXPECTATIONS; MATHEMATICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nodapa:169

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