A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton () and Michel Truchon

Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales

Abstract: Given the choice sets produced by a pair of Condorcet social choice correspondence, the following intersting questions arise. Does one of these sets always contain the other? If not, do they always interest or on the contrary can they have an empty intersection? Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1995) answer these questions for Condorcet social choice correspondences based exclusively on the simple majority relation, callaed C1 choice correspondences by Fishburn (1977). In the present paper, we conduct the same task for five Condorcet correspondences that require the size of the majorities to operate.

Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences (1996)
Working Paper: A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences (1996)
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