The Political Economy of Targeting: The Case of Majority Targeting
Philippe De Donder () and
Jean Hindriks ()
Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales
One of the most widely used method of targeting is to reduce welfare benefits as income rises. Although the need for such targeting is clear enough, it also entials two important difficulties. The purpose of this paper is to study the voting equilibrium of the degree of targeting and the level of taxation in an economy where labour supply is variable.
Keywords: TAXATION; WELFARE ECONOMICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nodapa:185
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