Rotten Parents

Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson

Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales

Abstract: The autors study the implications of the trade-off between child quality and child quantity for the efficiency of the rate of population growth. They show that if quantity and quality are inversely related then, even in the case of full altruism within the family, population growth is inefficiently high, if the family does not have, or does not choose to use, compensating instruments (for example, bequests are at a corner). In non-altruistic models this trade-off certaibly generates a population problem. The authors therefore prove that the repugnant conclusion is not only repugnant, it may be inefficient. However, we cannot expect intra-family contracting to resolve the inefficiency since it involves contracts which are not credible.

Keywords: FERTILITY; POPULATION; SOCIAL WELFARE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D10 D60 J13 J18 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Rotten parents (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nodapa:207

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