A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems

Francois Maniquet

Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales

Abstract: A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A Queue has been organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems (2003)
Working Paper: A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nodapa:222

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().