On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles

Vincent Merlin (), M. Tataru and Fabrice Valognes

Working Papers from Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales

Abstract: Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, Wj, to the alternative she ranks in Jth position in her preference ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles (2002)
Working Paper: The likelihood of Condorcet's profiles (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nodapa:223

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