Tax Competition and International Public Goods

Kjetil Bjorvatn and Guttorm Schjelderup

Working Papers from Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-

Abstract: In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding.

Keywords: CAPITAL; COMPETITION; TAXES; GOODS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H4 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Tax Competition and International Public Goods (2002)
Working Paper: Tax Competition and International Public Goods (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:norgee:15/00

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