Complementary Teams, Linear Sharing Rules and Uncertainty

Hans Hvide

Working Papers from Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-

Abstract: Two recent articles, Legros & Matthews (1993) and Vislie (1994), show that in a non-cooperative production game with stricly complementary (non-observable) inputs, interpretd as effort levels, there exists a linear budget-balancing sharing rule that implements the efficient effort vector in Nash strategies. In this note we test the linear implementability result for robustness.

Keywords: GAMES; UNCERTAINTY; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:norgee:2/97

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