Analysis of Senior-Subordinated Structures Backed by Private-Label Mortgages

Kose John, Crocker Liu and R. A. Radhakrishnan

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: This paper does a valuation analysis of senior-subordinated structure tranches backed by non-agency mortgages. The valuation is done using Monte Carlo simulation and employs the CIR interest rate process in conjunction with an empirical model estimated for non-agency mortgage prepayments and defaults. The sensitivity of the value of tranches to a number of variables are analyzed. We find that the interest rate process parameters significantly affect prepayments and defaults but not the relative value of the senior tranche. It is found that with the shifting of prepayments, the senior trances does not dominated all the junior tranches at all interest rates. The shifting of prepayments has the unintended effect of providing stability to the junior tranches by making their cashflows less sensitive to prepayments. Our main conclusion is that while the shifting of prepayments increases protection from default to the senior tranche for a given level of subordination, it has the unwanted effect of lowering its value through increased contraction risk. The value loss should be taken into account in determining the optimum level of subordination.

Date: 1998-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:98-047

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