Privatization with Political Constraints: Auctions versus Private Negotiations

Zsuzsanna Fluck, Kose John and S. Abraham Ravid

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently suboptimal privatization mechanism: private negotiations.

Date: 1999-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Privatization with Political Constraint: Auctions versus Private Negotiations (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-006

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